

## VI

### GURU NANAK'S CONCEPT OF NATURE

KAPUR SINGH

This paper deals with the following problem: Guru Nanak in his writings (*gurubani* — the voice of the Light, according to the Sikh creed), while formulating the philosophic bases of the Sikh religion, has employed an Arabic word, *qudret*.<sup>1</sup> It is a philosophical term correlated to the time-honoured Sanskrit term, *purusa*. In the traditional philosophic system of India, *purusa* is correlated to the term, *prakriti*. All religious systems of India, by tradition, must have one of the philosophical schools — six in number — as their base or they must be supported by an authoritative interpretation of the cryptic texts, *Brahmasutra* by Badarayana. Guru Nanak, on the other hand, has either taken ancient philosophical terms of India and then reinterpreted them or, as in the case of the term *qudret*, has picked up a non-Indo-Sanskrit word and then imparted a precise philosophic status to it. Here, it is proposed to examine what the dualism of *purusa* and *prakriti* originally meant in Indian philosophy and what extended and changed meanings the Guru has given to the first term of this dualism, *purusa*. Finally, it is proposed to scrutinize the semantic changes the word *qudret* has undergone till its exaltation as a fundamental philosophical concept of Sikhism. Possible reasons for Guru Nanak's choice of the term *qudret* are also briefly sought to be explained.

Guru Nanak was a prophet of religion, and philosophy was not central to his teachings.

Numerous dogmas there are and as many more are intellectual disciplines. As many are the systems of philosophy. All these, so many of them are the chains that curb the spontaneity of the psyche. For a man of religion, the central concern is the way to liberation.<sup>2</sup>

But that is not to say that Guru Nanak was unconcerned with the study of the humanities and sciences or placed little value on the culture of the mind.

There are those who are cultured neither in philosophy nor in scripture, nor have developed proper taste for music. And, likewise, there are those who are unacquainted with aesthetics and the arts. They have neither a trained character, nor disciplined intellect, and, as such, they

are devoid of true learning, so much so that the true significance of accumulated human wisdom is outside their sphere of interest. Such people, says Nanak, are true animals for they strut as human beings without the qualifications of a human being.<sup>3</sup>

Guru Nanak also asserts that:

Intellectual curiosity and scientific knowledge are necessary for removing doubts that beset human understanding.<sup>4</sup>

From this position of Guru Nanak, three propositions follow: (1) intellectual activity is not identical with or directly relevant to religious activity; (2) that, for a properly developed and integrated person, intellectual and scientific studies are imperative; and (3) that, although religion is philosophically indeterminate, philosophical enquiries are necessary for preparing the mind suitably towards the acceptance of religious discipline.

It is in this background that it is proposed to study and examine a philosophical problem which is fundamental to the philosophies of the East and the West and which Guru Nanak has explicitly stated and attempted to answer in his writings.

There are two fundamental concepts that run through almost all systems of Indian philosophy down the ages: the concepts of *purusa* and *prakriti*. Very broadly speaking, these concepts correspond to the concepts of "subject" and "object." The dualism between "mind" and "matter," "life" and "nature" has been recognized by thinkers in all philosophies of the East and the West, but the *Samkhya* system provides the most ancient and systematic speculation on this topic.

This system was founded by Kapila before sixth century B.C., but the original text *Samkhya Sutra* has been irretrievably lost. The basic text we have today is the *Samkhya-Karika* of Isvarakrishna of the fifth century. Commentaries on this text were written by Gaudapada in the seventh century. Another text, the *Samkhya-pravacan*, that has come down to us was considered to be Kapila's original text, but now it has been shown to be a work of the fifteenth century. Commentaries on this text were written by Aniruddha and Vijñanabhikṣu, who belong to the sixteenth century, approximately.

*Samkhya* doctrines of *purusa* and *prakriti* have undergone developments through the past centuries. In the *Bhagavad-Gita*, these concepts of *purusa* and *prakriti* have been given extended and more sophisticated meanings, whereas Vijñanabhikṣu and Aniruddha have developed the classical *Samkhya* still further.

Guru Nanak, in his writings, whereas he has retained the term *purusa* as fundamental to his system of religion, has abandoned altogether the term *prakriti* for this purpose, though he was quite familiar not only with the dualism of these terms, but also with their philosophical import.<sup>5</sup>

The term *purusa*, though retained as fundamental to what might be called the philosophic infrastructure of the religion he revealed, he has

interpreted it altogether otherwise than that in the classical *Samkhya*, the *Karika*, or the *Samkhya* of the *Bhagvad-Gita* or the Neo-*Samkhya* of Aniruddha and Vijñānabhikṣu. For the other term of this dualism, Guru Nanak has employed an Arabic word *qudret* and has relegated the term *prakṛiti* altogether to other contexts.

Let us examine briefly the original connotation of the term *purusa* to distinguish it from the vernacular or *apbhramsha* form of it, *purakh*, as employed by Guru Nanak with an altogether extended and new connotation given it. Let us also examine briefly the philosophical meanings of the term *prakṛiti* as understood in the ancient thought—system of *Samkhya* and to discriminate it from the Arabic word *qudret*, which Guru Nanak has substituted as the second term of this dualism, and speculate upon the reasons for it. Last, we may speculate upon what might be the motivation of Guru Nanak for substituting an Arabic word for one from Sanskrit-based vocabulary which latter was well integrated with Indian modes of philosophic thought.

Since it is not our purpose to write a dissertation on the system of *Samkhya* itself, it is most convenient to confine ourselves to the text of *Samkha-Karika*, for the purpose of examining the terms *purusa* and *prakṛiti*.

The world, manifest or un-manifest, according to *Samkhya*, is not derived from *purusa*, does not have its matrix in the mind. The world is comprehended in the term *purusa*, but does not originate from it and is not grounded in it. This *purusa* is not personal thought; it is discrete and individual (*Karika*, 38).<sup>6</sup> It is the propinquity of this *purusa* to *prakṛiti* which gives rise to the world of appearances. In the absence of this nearness, the world is there but it simply remains *avyakta*, un-manifest. This world is that which is perceived or witnessed, *lokyanti iti lokah*, and thus the world of appearances serves the purpose of the individual *purusartha* (*Karika*, 63).<sup>7</sup> This discrete and individual *purusa* is in itself translucent and transparent; it is a witness; it is a fact of consciousness and that is its primary mode of function, witnessing or seeing the world (*Karika*, 19).<sup>8</sup> It is inherent in this primary function of the *purusa* that by so functioning it appears different from what it is; it appears as if it were a panorama of appearances, and appearances likewise appear as if they were possessed of consciousness. That is how a double obfuscation afflicts the basic human situation, namely concerning its awareness of the world and of himself (*Karika*, 20).<sup>9</sup> The *purusa* appears as what it is not and the *prakṛiti* appears other than itself. This double negation occurs because of the very nature of the *purusa* which has its function as witness and to reflect or to appear as what it is not. In order to be what it is, it must appear as what it is not. It is to the implications of this doctrine that Bhai Nand Lal Goya, a contemporary and beloved disciple of the Tenth Nanak, Guru Gobind Singh, refers in his Persian poem.

We understand not that, from the beginning of Time, the human consciousness constitutes the instrumentality through which the Maker of appearances builds a mansion for Himself.<sup>10</sup>

It follows that in this arrangement between *purusa* and the process of *purusartha*, "for the sake of the *purusa*" no consciousness, deity or mind functions in the genesis of the manifest world. In its own nature, and by itself the world is simply *avyakta* (un-manifest) as long as it is not in the vicinity of the *purusa*. The ultimate *avyakta*, *mulaprakriti*, is a confection of three *gunas*, but these *gunas* do not become creative unless in the presence of the *purusa*. In its primal state, the *avyakta* potentially contains everything that is in the manifest world, but in, and of, itself it is just an unconditioned, un-manifest, plenitude of being which is completely and utterly unconscious (*Karika*, 11).<sup>11</sup> The manifest world begins to emerge or unfold when *purusa* comes into the proximity of this *avyakta*, the plenitude of the unmanifest being. The *gunas*, three in number, *triguna*, in admixture with the *mulaprakriti*, give rise to a series of evolutes or emergents from which is created the world of appearances. These *gunas* extend through the *avyakta* and *vyakta*, and they are continually modified and transformed in the proximity of the *purusa*. They constitute the psychophysical make-up of human nature and they likewise constitute the nature of everything non-human and inorganic and, thus, they represent the fundamental structure of both the worlds, the seen and the unseen. In themselves, however, they are wholly and utterly unconscious and like the *mulaprakriti* they are absolutely separate from the *purusa* (*Karika*, 14).<sup>12</sup>

Thus in this *Samkhya* philosophy, the fundamental categories recognize no consciousness, or absolute, or a creator God. It does not deny the existence of gods, or even a God, the only and lonely God. The God or the gods, indeed, may exist but they can be no more than products of the interaction of unconscious *mulaprakriti* and the conscious *purusa*, and the unconscious *gunas*.

It follows that this dualism of the ancient Indian *Samkhya* focuses on the distinction of the conscious and the unconscious, that between individual consciousness as one term and the unconscious as the other term. It is not the dualism of "mind" and "body" or the dualism of "thought" and "extension." "Thought" and "extension," "mind" and "body" are regarded simply as different dimensions or attributes of the world of appearances and this unity of "thought" and "extension" is supported by the doctrine of the *gunas*, which functions without hindrance on both the psychological and gross physical levels. The *purusa*, the essence of which is consciousness is not a part of the manifest world which is unconsciousness. The *purusa* is simply the fact of impersonal consciousness, not to be confused with *buddhi*, the intellect, *ahamkara*, the I-consciousness, or *manas*, the mind. The *ahamkara* and *manas* are the



evolutes of the three fundamental categories. Since the *mulaprakriti*, in admixture with the three *gunas*, makes up everything that constitutes the manifest world, including mental dimensions of the nature and man, the *purusa* is simply the presence of emptiness; as pure consciousness it simply witnesses or sees. It appears as what it is not, but its appearance is what it is. The content of this *purusa* can only be what it is not. Consciousness is always consciousness of something and pure consciousness is beyond the grasp of the mind and the intellect.

The insight is the *hridaya*, the heart, of the contribution of the *Samkhya* made to the philosophy and those so interested might find it rewarding to search for basic similarities between the *Samkhya* and the phenomenology of Sartre.<sup>13</sup>

The *Tantrayana* or *Vajrayana* school of Buddhism, founded in the fourth century by Arya Asanga, adopted this insight as the base of the doctrine of *Sunyata*, the basic emptiness that sustains the human situation, the world and man's awareness of it, *dridham saramasausiryam achhedyā abhedyā lakṣṇam adahi avinasi ca sunyata vajra mucayate* (*Sunyata* is designated as *vajra*, because it is firm, sound, cannot be pierced, cannot be penetrated, cannot be burnt and cannot be destroyed).

It is this insight on which are based the most charming pieces of poetic imagery in the ancient text of *Samkhya-Karika* which tell us that,

after showing her face to the *purusa* the *prakriti* disappears like a dancer after her enchanting performance on the stage. (59)

This is my considered view that there is nothing more sensitive and shy than *prakriti* who, once she knows that she has been seen by the *purusa*, never again unveils her bewitching face to the *purusa*. (61)<sup>14</sup>

It is on this insight that the Sikh doctrine of the utter irrelevance of science and objective knowledge to the penultimate goal of religion, namely deliverance from the bondage of *samsar*, the transmigration, is based.

Science purporting to be an end in itself is weariness of flesh and waste of soul.<sup>15</sup>

In the writings of Guru Nanak, the decisive argument against the utter irrelevance of objective science, and, by implication, against contemporary Western scientism is that by objectively becoming preoccupied with the phenomenal world, man inevitably becomes drawn into the morass of conjectures and illusions and, therefore, drawn away from the possibility of release or deliverance. The wish for exactitude of scientism can be shown as being far from constituting a guarantee of intrinsic value and spiritual legitimacy for the simple reason that the exactitude in question is already jeopardized by the most serious begging of the question: that is, scientism by denying the intellect and the Absolute rejects *a priori*

the certainty of all knowledge. This argument, in essence, occurs clearly and succinctly in the ancient Buddhist text, *Lankavatara-sutra* (400 A.D.) which runs as follows:

They do not understand that the objective world derives from the mind itself and do not grasp that the whole system of thought likewise derives from the mind; but attributing reality to these manifestations of mind they examine them, senseless people that they are, and get attached to dualities such as "this" and "that" or "being" or "not-being" without realizing that there is but a single Essence.

The religious system and the way of life which Guru Nanak revealed and preached are based on the philosophical doctrines that the one Absolute *Purusa*, both as self-conscious and unconscious, is the matrix of the world and not simply a term in a confection or admixture. That the world has a Creator, that as created Nature it has no absolute basis or essence independently and apart from this *Purusa*, and last, that the relation between the Creator and the created Nature is not a separate and independent category of existence, but is merely an extension, an emanation of this *Purusa*. This One Absolute *Purusa* is to be contradistinguished from the *Purusa* of the Vedas repeatedly described in all the four Vedas;<sup>16</sup> in *Purusasukta*, as "a fourth of Him is all beings and the three-fourths is in immortal heavens." This Vedic *Purusa* is not the Creator or Controller of the world but just the neutral stuff of the manifest and the unmanifest worlds, not fundamentally and essentially different from the *purusa* of the *Samkhya*.

The first of these two doctrines stems from the *Samkhya* dualism of *purusa* and *prakriti*, and the third, out of a pivotal problem of the nature of relation. In modern Western philosophy, Hume brought the problem of relation to the forefront, particularly the problem of the causal relation. But his formulation of this problem is in a very different context from that of the Indian philosophy, as Hume was attacking it in the context of British Empiricism. His problem is epistemological in nature, whereas that raised in Indian philosophy is metaphysical in nature where the question asked straightway is whether the relations are real.

Two basic features of our experience are identity and difference and we find them in our experience as subject as well as object. All pairs of categories, "subject" and "object," "substance" and "mind," "universal" and "particular," can be reduced to these two basic aspects of human experience, identity and difference. These two aspects are inevitably related to each other. They are not jumbled together. What is the nature of this relation between the two, and if this relation is real, how can both belong to one and the same thing, because both are opposed to each other fundamentally? Either the difference and the identity and the relation, all three, are equally real or the relation

between the two is false, whereas the two are real, or last, it might be that the relation as well as one of the relata is false. Of course, there is a fourth logical possibility that the identity, the difference as well as the relation might be equally false, implicating the ultimate *sunyata*, just as the *Vajrayana* Buddhism depicts it. The *Nyaya-vaishesika* and the *Mimamsa*, Jainism and the realist interpretations of *Vedanta* such as *Dvaita*, *Visistadvaita*, *Suddhadvaita* hold that all the three, the relata as well as the relation are real. Without holding this, it is not possible to uphold a pluralist view of reality, because how can there be an unreal relation between the two reals. The doctrine of *Samvaya* (inherence) of *Nyaya-vaishesika* and its doctrine of *asatkaryavada* (the theory that the effect does not pre-exist in its cause) is based on the reality of the relation and the relata. The Buddhist and the Vedantin, accepting the centrality of this problem of relation in the philosophical context of India, attacked the doctrine of the reality of relation with much vigour. The Vedantin attacked it by pressing the question that, if relation is real like the relata, this gives rise to *regressus ad infinitum*. The Buddhist puts the question: "If the relation is as real as the relata, why is it not seen as a thing as the relata are?" This weakness of the realist view of relation has given rise to the concept of release or *moksa*, which is central to all systems of Indian thought. Since *purusa* and *prakriti*, the one representing the identity and the other representing difference, are both real (the relation between the two is not ultimately real), the relation can be eliminated or removed by some technique or know-how, by some discipline or *sadhana* and thus *purusa* and *prakriti* can be released from the bondage of each other and the *purusa* freed from the drudgery of *samsara*.

The possibility of this release is logically implicated by the Buddhist dictum, *yo viruddha dharmadhyasavan ne asau ekah* (that which has opposite attributes cannot be one). There is, however, a flaw in this argument, for, it presupposes that relation merely implies a connection, but it fails to see that it also implies separation. Through rejection of the relation, therefore, they will not fall apart. Anyhow, if the relation between the *purusa* and the *prakriti* is false, what is there to separate the two. In other words, they cannot see that the conception of the two absolutes is self-contradictory, a gross nescience which is sought to be removed in Sikhism in the *Mul-Mantra*,<sup>17</sup> which has the arithmetical numeral '1' as its first term. But if the relation is not real, then the two terms, "identity" and "difference," are false. The Buddhist holds the "identity" as false. That is why the Buddhist rejects the unifying categories such as, "substance" or "universal," (*samanya*), and the Vedantin is in favour of the unifying category of *Atma: brahma satyam jaganmitthya jivabrahmaiva naparah*. The Vedantins and Buddhists both accept the falsity of the relation and also its implication that one of the relata must be false, but yet one goes to accept the



relata of "difference" and the other relata of "identity," and *Vedantins* argue that logically the "identity" is more fundamental than "difference," *abheda purvako bhedah*, while the Buddhist argues that reality must be *arthakriyakarin*, i.e. efficient, whereas the "identity," or "permanence," cannot be efficient. The *coup d'grace*, in this controversy, has been administered by the Madhyamika who rightly detects strains of dogmatism in both the schools which reject one relata and accept the other, and thus he argues that the "identity" and "difference" being correlated must disappear together and since *atmavada* and *anatmavada* are incompatible with each other, both cannot be accepted, but both can be rejected all right. If the falsity of relation leads to the falsity of one relata, the falsity of one relata likewise implicates the falsity of both the relates. This inexorable logic of the Madhyamika exalts the reality to a pedestal which is outside the reach of human experience. This would mean that the reality, or *tattva*, is completely beyond the reach of human experience and thus is logically unrealizable. If that is so, then all quests for the ultimate religious goal, the *summum bonum*, become futile and pointless. In order to remove the stigma of contradiction, the reality must be transcended, but in order to be realizable, it must also be immanent in experience.

It is in this background that Guru Nanak has favoured the three philosophical doctrines stated in the opening pages of this paper.

Guru Nanak, as we have said, employed the word *qudret* as the second term of the dualism, with *Purakh* as the first term. *Qudret* is an Arabic word, meaning "that under the power and authority of" its Master. *Al-Qadir* as one of the attributes is distinguishable from another attribute of God *al-Khaliq*, i.e. the Creator. In the Quran (57-3), with the contents of which Guru Nanak was familiar, it being part of the high culture of Islamic Asia during Guru Nanak's days of which Islamic Asia Punjab was an integral part in the fifteenth century, God is spoken of as "the First and Last."<sup>18</sup> He is also spoken of as "the Originator of Heavens and Earth." (6-101)<sup>19</sup> Guru Nanak, in his term *qudret*, includes both these Quranic attributes of God, *al-Khaliq* and *al-Qadir*.

He Himself creates and arranges the Nature, He Himself controls its progression and evolution. (*Basant*, I)<sup>20</sup>

He is the transcendent as well as the immanent and He is also the appearances. He is the Pure Consciousness, and He is also the Creator of the Nature. (*Sri*, I)<sup>21</sup>

The Universal Self has created the individual self and He Himself hath created the differentiating names. Thus Nature hath He created as 'the other' and depositing Himself therein He is in a relation of aesthetic contemplation to Nature. (*Asa*, I)<sup>22</sup>

Nature is all that appears and Nature is the World as seen, felt and



appreciated. Nature is all the spaces and Nature is the totality of forms.  
(*Asa*, I)<sup>33</sup>

Glory to Thee who dwelleth in Nature. Infinite and eternal. Thy limits and frontiers are unknowable. (*Asa*, I)<sup>34</sup>

He who has created the world in which He abides as Immanent, that Lord may be recognized through Nature. He is not to be regarded as wholly transcendent, as His voice can be heard in every heart.  
(*Padhans*, I)<sup>35</sup>

O true Lord, Thy created Nature is real. (*Asa*, I)<sup>36</sup>

All that is your *qudret* and you are its *Qadir* and *Karta*, i.e. Absolute Controller and Creator. (*Asa*, I)<sup>37</sup>

God creates Nature and single and alone He contemplates it. (*Asa*, I)<sup>38</sup>

The question arises but no answer is forthcoming: The purpose, the significance and the value of Nature are beyond man's comprehension.  
(*Gaudi*, I)<sup>39</sup>

The Lord contemplates His own creation, Nature. He contemplates it and he sustains it. Why? He who does, He alone knows. (*Padhans*, I)<sup>40</sup>

It thus becomes clear that Guru Nanak employs the term *qudret* to designate Nature and Cosmos, in the sense of the general cosmic order ordained by God in contrast to human derivations from it. Nature here is the complex of created things, in contradistinction to the Creator-Nature *Naturans* of scholasticism, whereas the created things are *Natura Naturata*. Guru Nanak adopted this word from the common lingual pool of the medieval Indo-Islamic world in which he lived. In Arabic, *qudret*, literally means power, might. The same word *qudret*, as a part of the Turkish language, means power, strength, omnipotence of God, Nature (*Turkish Language Dictionary*, by H. C. Hony, Oxford, 1957). This word *qudret*, as a verbal noun of *qadar* in the Persian language, means power, potency, authority of God, the Creation, Universe, Nature (*Persian-English Dictionary* by Steingass).

It was this word *qudret* which Guru Nanak picked up from the cultural parlance of his contemporary world to which he gave a precise meaning and philosophical exactitude.

The foregoing discussion suggests also the reasons for which Guru Nanak abandoned the term *prakriti*. The term *prakriti* has a permanent odour of absoluteness, existence in its own right, about it and no amount of reinterpretation of the term through the process which Nietzsche called, "transvaluation of values," could possibly have divested it of this inconveniently unpleasant smell. The "Nature," in Guru Nanak, is created by and is utterly dependent on the Creator, at every moment of its existence. The status of Nature in the philosophic scheme of

Guru Nanak is also encompassed within the time-cycle, so that the Quranic status of God, "the First and Last," remains intact.

This concept of Nature is totally different from the concept of *prakriti* which forms the warp of the entire fabric of Indian philosophy. It is strangely akin to the concept of "Nature" held by Meister Eckhart in his *Opus Tripartitum*.

It remains now to conjecture the reasons of Guru Nanak's being at pains to borrow a fundamental term of Sikh philosophy from a source, non-Indo-Sanskrit.

It would appear that the main reasons were three: (1) Primarily, Guru Nanak wanted a term of philosophy to which he could impart such connotation and meanings as would fit in with the base of the religion that he revealed. It is a subject in itself as to what that religion is and how precisely the concept of *qudret* is necessary for its intellectual base and proper practice. (2) Incidentally, Guru Nanak wanted to break the shell of prejudice enclosing the Hindu mind and attitudes towards modes of human communication in languages other than Indo-Sanskrit. There is a severe injunction in the *Bhavishyapurana*:

Even if the consequence is death, a true Hindu should refuse to learn the vulgar speech of the Western regions.<sup>31</sup>

This Guru Nanak discountenanced. It was concretized in the broad liberalism of the Tenth Nanak:

All languages of whatever people and whatever region of the earth and all the true sciences, they are proper and acceptable.<sup>32</sup>

Last, the Hindu mind was afflicted with a gross bias, for centuries past, symptomatic of dogmatism and mental stagnation. The famous Indologist, Al-Biruni (973-1048), in his *Kitabul-Hind* has recorded:

The Hindus think that there is no science, no knowledge which exists or has originated beyond the frontiers of the sacred land of India.

Guru Nanak aimed at opening the windows of the human mind to all the four quarters of space, so that man's mind may grow freely and his soul may remain whole through healthy contacts with the insights gained by mankind in all countries and in all ages, through such education as trains him to employ his "critical faculty as the anvil and the accumulated wisdom of mankind as the fashioning tool."<sup>33</sup>

1. The *Japu* is the pivotal text in the sacred writings of Guru Nanak and the first chapter in the *Guru Granth*, which every Sikh must commit to memory to recite it as the first ritual-prayer at dawn; it is the *hridayasutra* of the Sikh Scripture and in this text the word, *qudrat*, is straightway introduced:  
*Qudrati kavan kaha vicaru.*  
(*Guru Granth*, I, 4)
2. *Man hathi budhi ketia kete bed bicar, kete bandhan jia ke gurmukh mokh duar.*  
(*Guru Granth*, I, 62)
3. *Ikna nadu na bedu na gia rasu, rasu kasu na jananti,*  
*Ikna sidhi na budhi na aqali sar, akkhar ka bheo na lahanti,*  
*Nanak te nar asali khar, ji binu gun garabu karanti.*  
(*Guru Granth*, I, 1411)
4. *Man samjhavan karane kachuak parhiai gian.*  
(*Guru Granth*, Kabir, 340)
5. *Paramadbhutan parkriti parau.*  
(*Guru Granth*, Jaidev, 526)
6. *Tanmatra ... vises as tebhyo myta ... panca pancabhyah.*
7. *Purusartham prati vimocayaty ekarupena.*
8. *Kaivalyam madhyasthyam drastvaukar tatra bhavas ca.*
9. *Tasmat tatsamyogad acetanam ceta navad iva lingam*  
*Gunakartvau ca karteva bhavality udasinah.*
10. *Nadanistam az ruz-i-azal in naqsh-i-adam ra, ki naqqash az barae budan-i-khud khana misazad.*
11. *Trigunam aviveki visayah samanyam acetanam prasavadharmi*  
*I'yaktam tatha pradhanam tad vipari tas tatha 'ca puman.*
12. *Avivekyadih siddhas traigunyat tadviparya ya bhavat.*
13. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, tr: Hazel Barnes, N. Y. Phils: Lib., 1956.
14. *Rangasya darsayitya nivartati nartaki yatha nrtyat*  
*Purusasya tathatmanam prakasye nivartate prakrtih*  
*Prakrteh sukumarataram na kincid asliti me matir bhavati*  
*Ya drasta miti punar na darsanam upaiti purusasya.*
15. *Likhi likhi parhia teta karia.*  
(*Guru Granth*, I, 467)
16. It is found in Rig (X-20) and consists of 16 verses. It is ascribed to Rishi Narayana. In the *Shuklayajur*, *Tajsaneyi-samhita* (XXXI, 1.) it has 22 verses. In the *Taittiriya-aranyaka* of the *Krishnayajur* (III, 2) it has 18 verses. In *Arnya-samhita* of *Samaveda* (IV, 3) and in the *Atharva* (XIX, 3) also it is there.
17. *Ikoankar satinamu karta purkhu nirbhau nirvairu akal-murti ajuni saibhau gur-prasadi.*  
(*Guru Granth*, I, 1)
18. *Hu-w-al-awwal wal akhiru.*
19. *Badi al-samawat wal-arz.*
20. *Ape qudrati kare saji, sacu api nibere raju<sup>1</sup> raji.*  
(*Guru Granth*, I, 1170)
21. *Ape nevai duri ape hi ape manjhi miano,*  
*Ape vekhaj sunc ape hi qudrati kare jahano.*  
(*Guru Granth*, I, 25)
22. *Apinai apu sajio apinai racio nau,*  
*Duyi qudrati sajiau kari asanu ditho cau,*  
(*Guru Granth*, I, 463)



23. *Qudrati disai qudrati suniai qudrati bhau sukh saru,  
Qudrati patali akasi qudrati sarab akaru.*  
(Guru Granth, I, 464)
24. *Balihari qudrati vassia tera antu na jai lakhia.*  
(Guru Granth, I, 469)
25. *Jini jagu siraji samaia so sahibu qudrati janova,  
Sacra duri na bhaliai ghati ghati sabadu pachanova.*  
(Guru Granth, I, 581)
26. *Sacci teri qudrati sacce patisah.*  
(Guru Granth, I, 463)
27. *Sabh teri qudrati tun qadiru karta. . .*  
(Guru Granth, I, 464)
28. *Ape qudrati sajikai ape kare bicaru.*  
(Guru Granth, I, 143)
29. *Kahna hai kichu kahani na jai,  
Tau qudrati qimati nahi pai.*  
(Guru Granth, I, 152)
30. *Kita vekhai sahibu apna qudrati kare bicaro,  
Qudrati bicare dharan dhare jini kia so jane.*  
(Guru Granth, I, 580)
31. *Na paret yawani bhasha paran karan gaterapi.*
32. *Sabhai lokbhasha sabhai desh bani  
Sabhai shastra bidia samasto pardhani.*
33. *Ahrani mati vedu hathiaru.*  
(Guru Granth, I, 8)